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Abstract
The rapid rise of oil and gas production in the United States poses a new set of policy
challenges for local governments. Striving to balance the goals of encouraging economic
growth and mitigating its side effects, local governments across the country-especially
the small, rural communities where most drilling occurs-are developing an impressive
array of policy tools to limit the consequences of oil and gas drilling. In this thesis, I
explore how local governments have mitigated the side effects of the oil and gas
extraction process in very different ways, using case studies from Washington County,
Idaho; Dryden, New York; and Erie, Colorado.
I find that these localities' stories reflect three important trends in local policy-making.
First, the amount of regulatory authority states grant to localities helps explain why local
governments are choosing different policy options, though state preemption is still not
preventing localities from regulating oil and gas. Second, in the process of regulating
drilling, local governments are undergoing what I call "problem diffusion." Rather than
participating in policy diffusion, in which neighboring communities replicate policy
solutions, all three localities developed their policies based on their neighbors' problems
with oil and gas. And third, these localities were able to create and pass complex oil and
gas policies because they didn't have the financial or technical constraints often attributed
to local governments of small, rural communities. Instead, they actively navigated around
existing state statutes; did extensive research on policy options, aided by a wealth of
online resources; and even prompted state legislative action.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, oil and gas production has increased dramatically in the United
States-and local governments are rushing to catch up. With major technological
advances in the extraction process, companies that develop oil and gas resources have
been able to drill in new ways and new places. Beginning in the early and mid-1 980s, the
development horizontal drilling technologies reversed the trend of declining oil
production in the United States, opening up "unconventional" oil reservoirs that had
previously been deemed inaccessible.' Then came the refinement in the 1980s and 1990s
of a second technology, hydraulic fracturing. Oil and gas producers recognized the
potential of combining hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling by the early 2000s,
thereby improving the profitability of wells in both conventional and unconventional
reservoirs across the country.
Thanks to these developments, American oil production increased markedly in the
2000s, reaching approximately two billion barrels in 2010. Driven by production from
shale formations, natural gas saw an even more dramatic increase of 27 percent between
2005 and 2010, reaching 23.2 trillion cubic feet in 2010 (EIA 2011). The rapid rise in oil
and gas extraction, in turn, has had significant effects on oil and gas prices, and has
sparked economic growth in areas of production in the United States (EIA 2012).
Despite these benefits, many observers have become concerned about the public
health and environmental consequences of new drilling technologies. Some of their
1 In comparison to conventional oil and gas deposits, the tight sands, shales, and coalbeds that make up unconventional
reservoirs contain a smaller concentration of oil and/or gas over a larger area, which is less permeable than conventional
reservoirs (Vidas and Hugman 2008). Together, these factors make unconventional reservoirs it more technically
challenging to extract oil or gas from unconventional reservoirs.
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concerns are familiar to the oil and gas industry and their regulators. Cities and states with
a history of oil and gas development historically have regulated noise impacts, traffic
congestion, dust increases, and other common industrial environmental impacts (GWPC
2009, Riley 2007). But other concerns-about air pollution, water pollution, wastewater
transfer and disposal issues, depletion of local water resources, road damage, strains on
housing stock and local service provision, and the potential for boom-and-bust economies
-are often new to state and local governments (Goho 2012, Christopherson and Rightor
2011).
Some of these concerns result specifically from the rise of hydraulic fracturing, in
which large amounts of water, chemical cocktails, and small sand-like particles are
injected into a well at high pressure to break up the rock formation underneath and
release large volumes of oil or gas. This method-used after a hole is already drilled,
"icased," and cemented, but usually before it produces oil or gas-may cause side effects
including increased truck traffic (bringing water and chemicals), possible contamination of
underground drinking water resources with methane, and opportunities for spills during
chemical mixing pre-fracturing or during waste management post-fracturing (Osborn et. al
2011, API 2009). Other concerns arise from horizontal drilling, which can create tension
between subsurface minerals rights holders and surface rights holders. Because a mineral
rights owner theoretically could drill very close to a surface owner's home without
consulting her, some surface owners have become frightened about environmental
impacts from oil and gas drilling, over which they have no control (Rahm 2011). Finally,
unfamiliar environmental challenges can arise because of the rapid, concentrated
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development of newly accessible oil and gas reservoirs in small communities with no
recent history of intensive mineral extraction, like oil and gas development (GAO 2012).
Some of the environmental impacts of oil and gas drilling are already partly
regulated at the federal level by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under
environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, though commenters have
noted the holes in these statutes in relation to oil and gas drilling (Wiseman 2009). State
oil and gas boards may also limit day-to-day impacts that result from the extraction of oil
and gas, though the stringency of state regulations and enforcement can vary dramatically
from state to state (Wiseman 2012). But many environmental impacts that could be
regulated at the state or federal level simply are not regulated or enforced; others, like
housing stock strains and road damage, are local in nature and demand local solutions
(Dahl 2010).
The rapid rise of oil and gas production, horizontal drilling, and hydraulic
fracturing thus poses new set of policy challenges for local governments. Striving to
balance the twin goals of encouraging economic growth and mitigating its side effects,
local governments across the country-especially the small, rural communities where
most drilling occurs-are developing an impressive array of policy tools to limit the
consequences of oil and gas development, despite the constraints often placed on them by
state governments. This thesis investigates the varied responses of localities to oil and gas
drilling across the United States, answering both a theoretical question and a practical
one. First, why are local governments regulating the same problem-local impacts from
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oil and gas drilling-differently? Second, how are these small communities getting large,
complex regulations written and passed?
To address these questions, I examine recent efforts in three small localities: Erie,
Colorado; Washington County, Idaho; and Dryden, New York. All of these communities
have populations of less than 20,000, and all have attempted to mitigate the
consequences of the oil and gas extraction industry within the last two years. Erie first
imposed a drilling moratorium and then negotiated significant operating agreements with
two of the three major operators in the small suburban town (Aguilar 2012 a). Washington
County has relied heavily on conditional permitting special use approvals (Miller 2011).
And Dryden out-and-out banned natural gas drilling within its limits (Navarro 2012).
These cases illustrate the three different policy approaches local governments are using to
mitigate the impacts of oil and gas drilling: negotiated agreements, town-wide land use
restrictions, and moratoria and outright bans.2 Relying on primary legal sources,
newspaper accounts, and author interviews with ten key stakeholders, this thesis explores
why and how local governments have mitigated the side effects of the oil and gas
extraction process in very different ways.
Existing literature tends to emphasize only one factor that would explain why local
governments develop their own specific oil and gas regulations: the amount and type of
2 For a more thorough review of the policies legally available to local governments across the United States, see Goho
(2012), who focuses on how state preemption limits local abilities to regulate the "where," "how," and "if" of oil and gas
drilling in five states, and Dahl (2012), who reviews the regulatory options available to local governments in Colorado.
Soraghan (2012) and Maxwell (2009) describe how cities in Texas have long zoned for oil and gas drilling, and how
other cities in other states are starting to do so as well. Local governments may also choose policy tools that fall outside
these three main categories, like levying local fees or changing the pricing of a town's commercial water sales.
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regulatory authority states delegate to local governments, or the level of state preemption, 3
(Russel and Krummen 2012; Smith 2011; Goho 2012). And in each of the studied towns,
state preemption was an important constraint on officials when deciding on oil and gas
policies. Yet there was another reason why the three localities chose different regulations
for the same problem: residents and officials didn't see oil and gas drilling as the same
problem. Instead, they crafted policies as a result of what I call "problem diffusion"-they
tailored their responses to the specific oil and gas problems reported in neighboring
communities. These localities didn't participate in policy diffusion, in which neighboring
communities replicate policy solutions due to the kind of rational learning or public
pressure described in Berry and Berry (1990). Instead, all three localities developed their
own policies based on their neighbors' problems with oil and gas, whether they were
related to abandoned wells, community character, or air quality.
Of course, there were a variety of factors that then contributed to how these towns
got their chosen oil and gas policies passed. In two out of the three cases, grassroots
activists put specific problems related to oil and gas development on the localities'
agendas. One town, Dryden, benefitted from substantial regional policy learning; another
town, Erie, benefitted from its neighbor's previous regulatory efforts. But most
interestingly, these localities were able to create and pass complex oil and gas policies
because they didn't have the financial or technical constraints often attributed to local
governments of small, rural communities. These three localities were not passive,
3 In all states, local governments exist only as creations of the state, and thus localities only have the regulatory authority
that is given to them by state governments. Even in so-called "home rule" localities, which are given authority to
legislate in all ways unless the state government explicitly prevents them from doing so, local governments are often
".preempted" from regulating oil and gas by state statute. For more details, see Goho (2012) for a full discussion of
municipal legal authority to regulate oil and gas.
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incompetent recipients of state policy; instead, they actively navigated around existing
state statutes, did significant research on policy options aided by a wealth of online
resources, and even prompted legislative responses to their policies at the state level.
Washington County, Idaho
In all of Idaho's history, no one had ever seriously considered drilling for gas or oil
(Prentice 2010). That changed in 2010, when Bridge Resources, a small Denver-based oil
and gas operating company, drilled about a dozen exploratory wells in poor, rural Payette
County and found profitable levels of gas (Prentice 2010). Very quickly, Amanda
Buchanan and Rob Dickerson took notice. Both are long-time Idahoans and residents of
the Payette's northern neighbor, Washington County, and both were about to embark on
an effort that would showcase how state preemption, a lack of internal technical
constraints, and problem diffusion would allow Washington County to choose and create
its natural gas policies.
Washington County has long relied on agriculture and ranching as its economic
foundation. Four thousand of its ten thousand residents live in the county seat Weiser,
another several hundred live in either Cambridge or Midvale, and the rest are scattered
throughout the county's fourteen hundred square miles (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). With
such a dispersed population, the county functions as the major local government actor in
citizens' lives. Before anyone in Idaho thought to consider the availability of natural gas,
however, Washington County's most pressing resource issues were common to the Rocky
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Mountain West: conserving limited water for agriculture, and protecting the sage grouse's
habitat in the hope that the bird could be kept off the endangered species list.
All that changed in the middle of 2010, when local news outlets reported that
Bridge Resources had found gas in Payette County. Residents claimed that Bridge
Resources had agreed to not employ hydraulic fracturing, but then the company went
ahead and did so anyway, raising the ire of several landowners. Neither Payette County
nor its municipalities had rules in place directly addressing oil and gas activity, apart from
standard industrial zoning provisions. Idaho's Oil and Gas Conservation Commission had
not developed an oil and gas regulatory system since it was created in 1963, and had not
even met since 1993 (Dickerson 2013). So when Bridge Resources went bankrupt in late
2010, landowners in the county were left with liens and hydraulically fractured
exploratory wells in a variety of conditions, and the state was scrambling to create a
regulatory system to accommodate potentially significant future gas drilling activity.
As the story across the county line unfolded, Rob Dickerson started talking with the
Washing County Planning and Zoning Commission about oil and gas. As the county's
planning and zoning administrator, Dickerson had primarily dealt with agricultural-to-
residential rezoning and subdivision approval in the past. But as he and the commission
began discussing potential risks to the county and its residents, his department started
focusing on a comprehensive ordinance to address oil and gas. Dickerson was convinced
that, "with the lack of any kind of regulation from the state, we better come up with
something locally."
10
By March 2011, the planning and zoning commission was worried about how
unregulated oil and gas development could affect its water resources. The county already
struggled with naturally occurring arsenic and nitrate levels in its shallow aquifer. Its
agricultural economy depended on limited water resources, and there wasn't much more
water available for industrial activity. After hearing about Payette County, a member of the
commission bought the documentary Gasland and invited other members to view it.
Commission members discussed that hydraulic fracturing could impair their wells and,
most critically, that companies would not be liable for cleanup-or, like Bridge Resources,
would not even exist to be held responsible. They bristled at the prospect of open-air
wastewater pits wastewater dotting their county's landscape.
If this local debate had paralleled state and national policy debates around oil, gas,
and hydraulic fracturing, it would have started and ended here, with water. But in
Washington County, officials also worried about local concerns that they had heard from
Payette, like the possibility that "fracking trucks would destroy our roads"; "if someone
came in and tore up our roads, we don't have the population base to bear that cost of
repairing them" (Michael 2013). It seemed reasonable to assume that "oil and gas would
strain our emergency services" and that "operators should carry the right insurance"
(Dickerson 2013). They wanted to talk to the industry to keep them off sage grouse
habitats-before any environmental lawsuits were filed-and a few residents talked about
the character of their community. "There's a reason we moved out here," according to
resident Amanda Buchanan. "It's a small, quiet, slow-paced life to raise our kids."
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Despite some residents' community-oriented concerns, officials welcomed oil and
gas developers to the county-as long as they "followed the rules" and behaved as "good
citizens" (unlike Bridge Resources) (Michael 2013). In a conservative county, where all
county commissioners and administrators identified as Republicans, none of the elected
officials channeled their concern into proposals for bans, moratoria, or what they viewed
as overly restrictive land use laws being pursued by cities and towns in other states. The
problem they saw in Payette County wasn't the existence of oil and gas drilling; instead, it
was a drilling company not being responsible or playing by a set of reasonable rules. As
Dickerson saw it, "It's interesting because this is a really conservative part of a
conservative state, and usually it's 'drill, baby, drill."'
Yet instead of just encouraging industry and hoping the state would develop
adequate rules, Washington County busied itself with writing local rules in the summer
and well into the fall of 2011. By February 13, 2012, county officials had drafted a
stringent and comprehensive oil and gas ordinance. They had reviewed and pulled from
oil and gas land use ordinances across the country, particularly from Texas, to identify
possible oil and gas and regulatory strategies to deal with the problems they heard about
in national debate and saw across the county line. Ultimately, the ordinance's twenty-six
pages focused on making oil and gas exploration, drilling, and development a special use
across the county. After all, the county had successfully created and enforced special uses
in the past under Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act; as Dickerson thought, special use
provisions were "what we use here on other things." Under the special use framework
approved in February 2012, the county commissioners and planning and zoning board
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would have the opportunity to regulate and inspect each proposed development's site
plan, hydraulic fracturing method and chemicals, well casing and cementing, water
source, wastewater management strategy, emergency management plan, insurance, road
maintenance agreement, and all hazardous materials and other chemicals to be stored on
the site. All wells pads would have to be at least one thousand feet from a home, have
blowout prevention equipment and other safety valves and features, and meet some
chemical storage and leakage prevention requirements. Some operators would have to use
closed-loop wastewater systems as opposed to storage pits, and operators would need
special approval to locate in a floodplain. All operators would have to test nearby water
sources before and after drilling.
In addition, each operator would be required to disclose local or state inspection
information to the county, as well as any incident reports, and would have to be insured
to cover human and property damage as well as groundwater damage - under any
circumstance - and miscellaneous "environmental impairment." All well operators would
file a $250,000 bond with the county to ensure compliance with their road maintenance
agreements, any fines, and any possible environmental cleanups. If the state still didn't
furnish a technical advisor to local governments in the coming years to deal with the
challenges of enforcing such a technical ordinance, operators would be required to pay
for a private technical advisor to the county as needed.
The planning administrator is the first to point out the complexity and stringency of
this ordinance; he wrote it with the expectation that some of the requirements would get
"flushed out" during the hearing process. But after nearly twenty public hearings and
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meetings, it became evident there was overwhelming citizen support for retaining all the
site planning and operational regulations. Commissioner Rick Michael exclaimed, "When
we voted to pass that ordinance, it was the first time - I've been a commissioner for ten
years - it was the first time people stood up, clapped, and cheered." Dickerson
remembered, "There'd be fifty people in the room and one person against what the
ordinance contained."
At this point in the story of Washington County's oil and gas ordinance, the
county's elected officials seem to have avoided any of the factors that would prevent them
from innovating. According to Shipan and Volden (2006), local governments may fail to
regulate or innovate because they lack a certain level of professionalism. Confronting
large, complex issues may be a struggle for small governments due to lack of financial,
technical, and political resources. These capacity constraints may lead them to regulate oil
and gas using tools their staff is already comfortable with, like setback requirements and
other conventional land-use tools. Such constraints may also lead local officials to choose
tools that are less expensive to write and implement. In addition, small communities may
not know how to lobby higher levels of government in comparison to larger counties and
municipalities, so they may be more hesitant to select an aggressive tool that could
provoke state regulators and legislators.
In this case, Washington County's internal technical constraints turned out to be
inconsequential. While the county's officials began with tools they had worked with
before-setbacks, special use permits, and bonding requirements-they also incorporated
new elements into those tools, like road maintenance agreements and blowout prevention
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requirements. And they branched out into new territory, like water sampling and
requirements for a technical advisor. After spending more than a year ironing out the
details of their ordinance, officials regarded any capacity constraints from within
Washington County as surmountable, especially given their extensive research into and
reliance upon other oil and gas ordinances from across the country; their ability to break
free from internal constraints was surely aided by the wealth of ordinances and local
government resources available online. They discussed the potential challenges from
enforcement early on in planning and zoning commission meetings, county officials were
unfazed by the new enforcement and implementation challenges they had created for
themselves with this ordinance.
As it turned out, however, state preemption would play a role in their oil and gas
policy process; Washington County was not the only governmental body that reacted
strongly to the discovery of natural gas in Payette County and the subsequent buy-up of
mineral rights in surrounding counties. In the fall of 2011, after Washington County started
its ordinance drafting and hearing process, the Idaho House Resources and Conservation
Committee began a negotiated rule-making process to update the state's decades-
untouched oil and gas rules. Although the committee meetings were open to the public,
Washington County resident and activist Amanda Buchanan found that she was the only
member of the public regularly attending. Alarmed after reading an article in the Weiser
Signal about Payette County's problems and Washington County's extensive mineral rights
leasing in early 2011, and remembering a showing of Gasland she had seen on PBS a few
years prior, Buchanan got involved in the state process, and only later in the county policy
15
process. And like Buchanan, Washington County's other engaged citizens provided
critical support for the county's efforts to regulate oil and gas once they got off the
ground-but the initial push to regulate came from within local government, rather than
from below.
By early November, as Buchanan attended state rule-making meetings and other
residents attended county work meetings, Washington County was receiving final
comments and making final changes to its ordinance. The county had been in contact
with representatives of Snake River Oil and Gas, the major oil and gas leaseholder in the
county, to get input on its rules; the company representatives worked with the county
while encouraging them to wait for state rules. Then, in late November, Washington
County's three commissioners received an unexpected email from the legislative
representative at the Idaho Organization of Counties. The House Resources and
Conservation Committee had started considering legislation to prohibit counties and local
governments with land use powers from regulating any oil and gas operations and siting-
a significant chunk of what Washington County hoped to do. Commissioner Michael later
reflected, "The industry and their lobbyists were bullies. All that time, they were working
behind our backs to get state legislation passed."
The commissioners and planning and zoning officials faced a dilemma. They could
try to pass their ordinance as soon as possible-or they could wait for the state to create its
rules. Washington County chose the former. A week after the House committee in charge
of oil and gas sent a bill to the floor stripping local governments of authority to regulate
any oil and gas operations or siting, the Washington County Commission unanimously
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passed its oil and gas ordinance. Rick Michael, the commissioner who was most vocal
about supporting the ordinance, recognized that the county would potentially have to
change it to comply with new state rules. But he later commented, "At that point, the state
had very little regulation that helped us." In February, he told the Idaho Statesman, "We
can always amend it if we have to" (Barker 2012).
Two months later, the Idaho legislature approved House Bill 484, which eliminated
local governments' authority to regulate most of the day-to-day operations of oil and gas
activity and transferred that authority to the Idaho Oil and Gas Commission. The statute
required that all local governments consider new oil and gas permit applications within
twenty-one days of their receipt, and it prevented local governments from regulating
siting. It explicitly disallowed local governments from prohibiting oil and gas extraction or
any type of industrial activity related to oil and gas.
Unwilling to violate state law and wanting to avoid lawsuits from industry,
Washington County updated its oil and gas ordinance to be consistent with House Bill
484 and passed it again on December 4, 2012. The amended ordinance retained the
thousand-foot setback provision, bonding and insurance requirements, a road
maintenance agreement, and an industry-funded technical assistance account. Officials
and citizens who had been involved in crafting the original ordinance-like commissioner
Rick Michael, administrator Rob Dickerson, planning and zoning commission member Jeri
Soulier, and activist Amanda Buchanan-expressed disappointment over the loss of local
control over the oil and gas industry, but they remained optimistic that many of the
original provisions remained in place and seemed consistent with the new state law.
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The results of Washington County's ordinance are still unfolding. Several residents
continue to distrust the oil and gas industry and are skeptical of how successfully their
ordinance can be enforced. Idaho governor Butch Otter opposes stringent oil and gas
regulations at either the state or local level. As of early January, rumors had spread that
Snake River Oil and Gas had already begun exploratory drilling in the county without
applying for permits. At the same time, by early 2013 several neighboring counties had
requested copies of Washington County's amended ordinance and were considering
enacting their own rules.
Not constrained by their technical limitations, and supported by their citizens,
Washington County's officials took a bold step to encourage oil and gas operators to "play
by the same rules as everyone else," only to have their authority constrained by a hostile
statehouse. After seeing the problems of gas drilling play out in Payette County, county
officials quickly did their best to mitigate these side effects of gas drilling. In the process,
they experienced a form of regional problem diffusion, by focusing on regulations that
addressed problems in Payette County, while still drawing on ordinances and other policy
innovations from cities around the country. This story also suggests that local governments
innovate and regulate differently in part because the primary oil and gas regulators, states,
vary significantly in the stringency and explicit preemption of their regulations (GWPC
2009, Wiseman 2012). In Washington County, the state's lax regulations made county
officials feel the need to "pick up the slack" (Smith 2011).4 Yet Washington County
4 To be consistent with this theory, we would expect local governments in other states with stringent
regulatory schemes would feel less pressure to create their own regulations. However, as a following case
will show, the Town of Erie felt significant pressure to regulate oil and gas, even though Colorado has
relatively stringent regulations.
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officials never feared that, if they adopted stringent standards, state regulators and
legislators would respond by taking away some of the county's land use powers, even
though that is ultimately what happened.
The officials in Dryden, New York, tell another story about the factors influencing
their policy process. At the same time that Washington County started putting together its
first ordinance, officials in Dryden, New York, were discovering that oil and gas lease
holders and their own citizens would play an important into their policy decision-making
process-far more than the state.
Dryden, New York
Before the two oil- and gas-holding formations underneath upstate New York, the
Marcellus and the Utica, were considered accessible, Dryden's 14,000 residents weren't
up in arms about much. The large, square town had long been evenly split in economic
function. Residents say that half of the town acts as a bedroom community for the town of
Ithaca and Cornell University, and the other half maintains farms that have been in the
family for generations. The town had not been seriously split on local political issues in
recent memory, and the planning department's biggest push over the past few decades
concluded with the approval of a new comprehensive plan in 2005. That political calm
changed shortly after Dryden's town leaders started seeing a mineral rights buy-up in their
rural ninety-four square miles, and after natural gas drilling and hydraulic fracturing
became one of the hot topics in New York State. During the ensuing turbulence, Dryden's
town officials would experience how resident pressure, a lack of state involvement,
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regional policy learning, a lack of internal technical constraints, and undertones of
problem diffusion would all push them to innovate in the regulation of oil and gas drilling.
In Dryden, the town first had help from the dozen or so other local governments in
Tompkins County. The county's towns, including Ithaca, had long been part of the
Tompkins County Council of Governments, a voluntary regional organization built around
issue-focused working groups. As these towns noticed an uptick in well permit
applications in 2009-including one near Dryden's Town Hall-they started working
together to look at the effects of oil and gas drilling, focusing especially on communities to
their south in Pennsylvania.
Dryden's town supervisor Mary Anne Sumner describes two "buckets" of oil and
gas community impacts that she learned about from the County Council: one
environmental and one community-oriented. Sumner worried about "the likely
contamination of water or soil or air" if the industry moved in. The town's planner
seconds that "water has been the central issue" in the town, especially groundwater. Most
of the town gets their water from private wells, and even the main town water district gets
its water from a large municipal well. "But the more immediate thing," claims Sumner,
"the thing that is easier for residents to understand is the surface impacts: the traffic, the
emergency response risks, the increased number of workers and pressure around housing
prices. All those community impacts." With the nearest interstate nearly thirty miles away
from the center of town, the many trucks expected to arrive with industry would have to
drive down suburban and rural roads that were never designed for heavy traffic. So the
Tompkins County Council of Governments began reviewing these concerns through its
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gas drilling task force, and according to Sumner, "the more we learned, the more we
realized we were not probably ever going to be prepared. It's just not who we are."
Recognizing the incongruity between drilling in Pennsylvania and Dryden's residents'
rural lifestyles, she added, "Well, then we started to talk about limitations on gas drilling."
As officials in the many towns of Tompkins County were organizing to learn about
gas drilling and regulatory options, citizens within Dryden began doing the same. Even
though New York State had imposed a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing to study its
environmental impacts in 2008, Dryden's residents were wary of the day when that
moratorium would end. In the middle of 2009, a group of local activists began meeting to
prevent oil and gas drilling from disrupting their homes and community. They called
themselves DRAC, the Dryden Resources Awareness Council. Some, like DRAC organizer
and activist Marie McRae, felt coerced into signing oil and gas leases in the preceding
years and were terrified of what gas drilling could do to their properties. Others had
moved to Dryden with the hopes of a quiet, rural lifestyle, and were worried about
possible environmental contamination and industrial activity rumbling into their small
town. Many had attended educational meetings around the county, hosted by the
Tompkins County Council of Local Governments or scientists at Cornell. Almost all cited
the drilling impacts they saw in neighboring Pennsylvania. As McRae learned more about
gas drilling, she found herself most concerned about "the intense industrialization" of her
town. She argued, "I don't want a big gas extraction industry as my neighbor. That's not
why I live here."
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With information from the council of governments in hand-about both
community risks and potential regulatory options-Dryden officials started considering
ways to prevent gas drilling from entering the town. DRAC members quickly got involved.
Determined to ban natural gas drilling within town limits, "using whatever language had
to be used," DRAC members initiated a voter petition drive in late 2010 to push Sumner
and the town board to act. Over the next five months, the group collected sixteen hundred
signatures from voters, which they determined was "enough to make or break an election
for a town board member" (McRae 2013). A core group of activists spent the majority of
their days working every political angle they could to prevent natural gas drilling; one
member estimated she spent six hours a day on gas drilling issues.
Both activists and town officials knew that the town's authority under state law to
ban gas drilling was murky. Towns were clearly pre-empted by New York state law from
regulating the operations of natural gas drilling, which is the job of the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) (Hall 2013). But Dryden did have the
authority to regulate gas drilling from a land use perspective. In other words, they could
regulate the "where" of drilling, if not the "how" (Goho 2012). Grappling with where
exactly this left the town in its regulatory authority, Dryden's government spent about a
year, between mid-2010 and mid-2011, determining how they could prohibit natural gas
drilling in their town, in both a politically and a legally defensible manner. The town felt
the pressure of DRAC activists and others in their community, the impending end of the
state's moratorium on drilling, and the encouragement that all their neighboring towns
were working towards some type of a drilling ban. They also knew that not everyone in
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their town would support a ban; a third of the town's land was already leased, and a ban
would mean that some of those residents would not be seeing the royalty revenues they
anticipated under their mineral rights lease agreements. Moreover, despite its nearness to
the college town of Ithaca, the town was home to a sizeable conservative, "pro-property
rights" group. But the DRAC pressure was significant, and almost every town in Tompkins
County was committed to preventing drilling in their communities.
Now the question was: what policy tool should they use to implement the ban?
Some activists suggested imposing a moratorium, a temporary ban commonly used by
planning departments so they can study an issue before regulating it. Such a tactic was
clearly legal in the short term. In fact, close to a hundred local governments in New York
had instituted a moratorium on oil and gas drilling at some point, as of late 2012 (Goho
2012). Town officials were immediately skeptical of that strategy, however. According to
the planning director, Dan Kwansnowski, "we felt like the DEC was already doing that
study, so it didn't make sense for us to do one. It seemed like it didn't fit legally to us."
Others suggested complex zoning amendments that implicitly banned drilling,
defining heavy industrial activity to permit some industry but exclude oil and gas
drilling-without ever explicitly singling out a particular land use. While many other
towns in Tompkins County ultimately adopted this strategy, Dryden's town supervisor,
attorney, and planning director were unconvinced. They thought the approach was
unnecessarily complicated. Moreover, they suspected a zoning amendment that clearly
banned gas drilling would be more legally defensible. As DRAC members revealed the
efforts of their petition drive, and the state seemed close to ending its moratorium in the
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spring of 2011, the town decided that a zoning amendment clearly banning gas drilling
was their policy tool of choice. After a summer of public hearings, on August 2, 2011, the
town board passed a series of zoning amendments that added gas and oil exploration,
extraction, storage, treatment, disposal, and "support activities" to their zoning
ordinance's list of prohibited uses.
Whereas Washington County's ordinance prompted a standing ovation, one activist
noted that Dryden's Town Board passed its ordinance "against heavy, heavy protest."
DRAC's members had organized a significant percentage of the town, but throughout the
summer another portion of town came out against the drilling ban. Yet Town officials felt
supported by the wave of bans being passed throughout the region. The Town of Ithaca
passed its ban a few days before Dryden, and Ulysses, Newville, Danby, and others
followed within a matter of weeks. Town supervisor Sumner was optimistic; as more
towns passed their bans, she thought, "Well, we're kind of all in this together. It's a big
help."
But, as in Washington County, Dryden's gas drilling ordinance didn't end there.
Within a month of the amendment's passing, the town's major leaseholder, Anschutz
Exploration Company, sued Dryden for overstepping its regulatory authority and ignoring
New York's state preemption. Theoretically, one would expect that a local government
like Dryden would be so risk-averse that it would never have passed a ban if it had
anticipated such a costly lawsuit (Pollak 2000). Governments of small, rural communities
simply may not have the resources or technical capacity to defend themselves against
lawsuits brought by a deep-pocketed oil and gas operators. Yet Dryden officials knew that
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someone in Tompkins County would be sued for regulating gas drilling. According to
Sumner, "we absolutely believed...that the whole issue would settle in court. So yes, we
absolutely expected a lawsuit somewhere.. .but we didn't realize at the time that it would
be us. Looking back, we probably should've realized that." The planning director echoed
that sentiment, commenting that the town had a "healthy fund balance" and assessed
property values, so "it was pretty comfortable to say that we can defend this." Town
officials didn't feel limited by any financial constraints, and felt comfortable enough
professionally to defend their ordinance in court.
Luckily for Dryden, in late February 2012, the first leg of the lawsuit came to a
close. The New York Supreme Court upheld the town's ability to list gas drilling as a
prohibited use; the Town of Dryden had prevailed over the oil and gas operator's lawsuit.
Town board members and the town supervisor also survived a heated election in the fall
of 2012, affirming residents' dedication to banning gas drilling within the town limits.
So resident pressure, regional policy learning, problem diffusion, and a lack of
technical or financial constraints pushed Dryden to adopt their ban-and a lack of state
preemption or involvement allowed them to continue to do so. A grassroots push from
below, driven by problems seen in Pennsylvania, encouraged the town to act on gas
drilling. Information provided by local activists and nearby towns encouraged the town to
pick their policy approach: adding all oil and gas activities to the list or uses prohibited by
its zoning code. Dryden experienced very few technical constraints from within, and even
the threat of a lawsuit did not constrain the town's actions to adopt its drilling ban. The
town's economy didn't seriously depend on the oil and gas industry, and the town had
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enough money to defend itself against the lawsuit brought by an oil and gas operator. The
state was largely absent, politically and legally.
In Dryden today, activists continue to pressure the town to enact a road protection
program, which would require negotiated agreements between any major industrial
project leaders and the town, as well as a water protection program and new "critical
environmental area" designations. Town members and activists feel confident that the
lawsuit's result will be upheld in the ongoing appeals process (which is now managed by
the national environmental nonprofit Earthjustice). The New York DEC still has its
hydraulic fracturing moratorium in place, so the town does not yet have to worry about
enforcing its ordinance; no one can drill in New York State anyway. But when the town
does need to implement its ordinance, its current set of town officials are committed to
doing so. As Sumner says, if the DEC doesn't enforce Dryden's local ban, "we'd be right
out there with an injunction and we would be up to our necks in another lawsuit, but we
would do it. We would absolutely do it."
Erie, Colorado
The town of Erie, Colorado, faced a different set of pressures when deciding how to
regulate oil and gas. This wealthy suburban community, located in Colorado's Front
Range on the fringe of metropolitan Denver and fifteen miles away from Boulder, already
had a great deal of oil and gas drilling within its forty-eight square miles-over three
hundred wells. Its northwest neighbors in Weld County had about eighteen thousand
wells. As of early 2012, like many neighboring municipalities, the town already had basic
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oil and gas exploration and drilling permitting processes in place, including site plan
review; noise, dust, and light mitigation; and traffic management planning. For its part, the
state had overhauled the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) to
make it a stronger regulator in 2008, and then responded to the large rise of oil and gas
drilling in Colorado with new regulations for the practice of hydraulic fracturing in late
2011. So it was not the new possibility of drilling that brought the issues of hydraulic
fracturing and horizontal drilling to the forefront of the town's politics in 2012; rather, it
was a the possibility of a well pad in an unusual location. In response, Erie's town
government would create innovative policy as a result of resident pressure and the
problem diffusion of local air quality issues, given constraints from the town's finances
and state preemption.
In late 2011, a group of Erie parents discovered that the oil and gas operator
Encana had been approved to start drilling and hydraulically fracturing eight wells at a site
it called Canyon Creek in early January. Much to their surprise, that site was within a
thousand feet of the brand new, LEED-certified Red Hawk Elementary School, and within
two thousand feet of Erie Elementary School. A group of concerned mothers began
meeting to study the risks posed by drilling and hydraulic fracturing, hoping to prevent the
town from allowing this project to move forward.
Many of the mothers reported that members of their family had experienced health
problems since moving to Erie, especially during times when nearby oil and gas wells
were drilled, and they were growing increasingly concerned about their children's
respiratory and gastrointestinal problems. They saw increases in asthma, headaches, and
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dizziness in themselves and their children, and they were particularly concerned about
the town's air quality. "We're just sick," April Beach, an Erie Rising activist, told the Daily
Camera. "The reality is that we were never sick until we moved to Erie and we were never
sick until after the drilling" (Aguilar 2012a). They were also worried about the drilling
trucks rolling in front of their children's school; not only would the many trucks increase
diesel fumes near their children's playground, but they would create the potential for a
spill of chemicals and hazardous waste being trucked in and out near the schools.
In early January 2012, members of Erie Rising began meeting with the town's board
of trustees (equivalent to a town council) and gaining publicity in Boulder's local news
channels and newspaper, the Daily Camera. Over a dozen parents and a half-dozen
scientists brought public testimony to a board of trustees meeting in early January, in
which the parents pushed for a temporary stop to new drilling permits until the health
implications of drilling in the town, especially related to air quality, were better
understood. Around this same time, Encana agreed to delay drilling near Red Hawk
Elementary, presumably in response to the public uproar over their plans. By late January,
the town's staff had presented to the board of trustees an eight-point checklist of regulatory
options available to the town. In contrast, Erie Rising's members asked for a simpler
approach-a moratorium on oil and gas drilling to study air quality issues. In late January,
the board voted down the moratorium. They did, however, agree that the town would
work to implement an air quality monitoring system and purchase a source water
monitoring system, and would explore opportunities to require oil and gas operators to
implement "best management practices" to reduce air pollution.
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Then, in early February, April Beach contacted Dr. Steven Brown, a chemist at the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to find out more about air quality in
the area. Brown had been analyzing data from an air quality monitor located on a tower
in the town to find out more about nitryl chloride, a chemical unrelated to oil and gas
drilling, in the region. At Beach's request, Brown looked instead at the tower's data on
drilling-related compounds that could cause ground-level ozone problems: volatile
organic compounds like propane and ethane. Both he and Beach were so surprised by his
findings that Brown agreed to present them immediately to Erie's board of trustees in late
February.
Before the trustees, Brown reported that he found levels of propane and ethane in
Erie's air that were ten times those found in Los Angeles and several times higher than the
levels found in Houston (Aguilar 2012b). The Board was shocked into action: within two
weeks they had passed an 180-day moratorium on all new oil and gas permit approvals in
town limits. At the same time, several board members remained skeptical. Trustee Mark
Gruber remembers, "My concern was that there really was no proof for or against the
health impacts of the industry, so we really needed to take time to do the research." They
would use the time to gather all the information they could about the air quality impacts
from drilling and to explore regulatory options.
Trustees and town staff immediately reached out to local scientists, state regulators,
and environmental contractors to discover the health implications of elevated propane
and ethane, as well as potential emissions sources. By contrast with Dryden and
Washington County, town officials and activists in Erie were not worried about
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groundwater contamination, since their drinking water mostly came from surface water
sources outside of their town; instead, they focused on air quality. By early May, town
officials had received two reports that, while Erie's levels of propane and ethane were
noticeably higher than average in the United States, they were about a thousand times
below EPA's health standards (known as primary ambient air quality standards). Although
gas well air quality testing was prohibitively expensive for the town on its own-$250,000
for every well-Erie officials eventually worked with the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment to test air quality around the completion of the wells near Red
Hawk. Later, Brown and his colleagues would report that about half of the propane and
ethane levels were attributable to oil and gas drilling activities, and that much of the
pollution probably originated from drilling outside of the Town of Erie (Gruber 2013).
Town officials became more and more certain that air quality concerns related to
propane and ethane were troubling but unlikely to cause health problems; Erie Rising
activists were not convinced, however. They continued to explore what could be causing
their health problems, to study the broader potential problems associated with drilling,
and to protest drilling activities in the town limits. Drilling at the Canyon Creek site, which
was within a thousand feet of Red Hawk Elementary but had already been permitted
before the town's moratorium went into effect, began in late May, and Erie Rising activists
protested and signed petitions. The Board of Trustees felt compelled to do whatever they
could to minimize risks at this site; they agreed to sell water to Encana directly from the
city's fire hose to reduce truck traffic in front of the schools, and they soon doubled their
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cost for commercial water used for oil and gas drilling to encourage operators to reduce
truck traffic.
In trying to respond to local citizens, town officials were working within significant
legal constraints from above. Over the preceding two decades, Colorado case law had
developed to the point that local governments could not substantively regulate the "what"
and "how" of drilling or prohibit oil and gas in the towns altogether (Dahl 2010). Unlike
in Dryden, where local authority had yet to be determined by the courts, Erie town
officials knew where their authority ended. Towns were even limited on regulating the
"where" of drilling: the state regulatory board, COGCC, sets statewide setback limits for
wells, which were 150 feet for rural areas and 300 feet for more urbanized areas in 2012
(Wilson 2012). Erie's neighboring town, Longmont, was already living a cautionary tale of
over-stepping state preemption among Erie's officials. In July of 2012, the town prohibited
oil and gas development within residential parts of the community and mandated a 750-
foot well setback, and was promptly sued by the state (specifically by the COGCC); in
November, its residents voted to ban the practice of hydraulic fracturing within its town
limits and was promptly sued by the Colorado Oil and Gas Association and the State of
Colorado. By looking at their neighbors, the Board of Trustees had a clear idea of the
many lawsuits that could happen if they took more stringent regulatory approaches like
Washington County or banned oil and gas like Dryden, and they were unwilling to use "a
big chunk of the budget" to defend a rule in a case where they would almost certainly lose
(Gruber 2012).
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So the town staff got creative. Using their six-month moratorium as a starting
point-a way to get local oil and gas operators to the table-they began negotiating
contracts, known as memoranda of understanding (MOUs), with the operators. Erie didn't
have the option of requiring that local operators implement the best management
practices it had put together on its eight-point checklist from January, but it could
assemble the right combination of carrots and sticks to get operators to sign a contract
binding them to those practices. After all, other municipalities had already been signing
MOUs for specific well pads for a number of years, although no other city had attempted
to negotiate a MOU for a whole company's operations in town limits.
After a summer of negotiation, in late August the Board of Trustees signed MOUs
with Encana and Anadarko, two of the three oil and gas operators in the town. In
exchange for ending the moratorium on new permits for these operators and providing a
fast-track permitting process, these operators agreed to the majority of the town's
checklist. For the next three years, Anadarko and Encana would not use any diesel fuel,
benzene, or 2-butoxyethanol when hydraulically fracturing their wells. They would agree
to work with the town to identify water sources close to sites to reduce truck traffic and
create a traffic management plan to reduce that traffic even further. They would set
equipment and wells back from buildings and houses "to the extent feasible and
practicable," as determined by the companies, and they would notify landowners within a
half-mile radius of any major drilling or completion activities. Spills would be prevented
from damaging nearby lands by using steel-rim berms around equipment, rather than sand
or soil berms, and operators would use closed-loop systems, which effectively eliminate
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the need for open pit storage of wastewater. Finally, and most importantly from an air
quality perspective, the MOUs required companies to use a vapor recovery unit. Current
COGCC standards allowed oil and gas operators to emit up to 5 percent of their wells'
production; a vapor recovery unit is guaranteed to recover at least 98 percent of all
emissions, and in some cases up to 100 percent of a well's emissions (Aguilar 2012a). As
Gruber remembers, "That was a biggie for me, and I think for most people, because that
was the issue that was driving this-air quality."
Erie's policy innovations arose after concerned residents put the region's problem
of air quality from oil and gas on the agenda, although state preemption and the town's
limited budget together constrained Erie's policy options. Pressure from below in the form
of grassroots activism bolstered by alarming scientific findings first prompted Erie to pass a
moratorium, and then pushed the town to do something more concrete about drilling and
air quality. But legal constraints from above dramatically limited the town's regulatory
opportunities, and the town was unwilling to spend its limited budget fighting lawsuits.
Capitalizing on the state's general support for negotiated agreements, the increased
negotiating power brought by the moratorium, and the small number of operators in the
town's limits, Erie instead regulated oil and gas operations by contract with two out of
three operators. While financial constraints were important in the town's regulatory
process, capacity constraints certainly were not; these contracts took months of
negotiating, and required a sophisticated understanding of oil and gas best management
practices.
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After the MOUs were signed, Erie's oil and gas controversy seemed to both settle
down within the town and ripple throughout the state. Activists with Erie Rising were
unimpressed by the MOUs' requirements. Jen Palazzolo told the Daily Camera, "It really is
a smokescreen and not even close to a monumental event," although she praised the
vapor recovery system requirement (Aguilar 2012a). Several of the group's members
decided to sell their homes and leave the town, and others turned their attention to
advocacy at the state level. The COGCC was supportive of the town's efforts, and even
agreed to include the MOUs' best management requirements in all state permits it issued
to the companies within Erie's town limits, thus providing extra enforcement back-up to
the town in the event one of the companies deviated from the contracts' requirements.
Matt Lepore, the COGCC's director, told local papers that he thought that city and county
MOU use would grow after "Erie paved the way" (Aguilar 2012a), and Erie's controversies
seemed to influence updates of several of COGCC's regulations.
Perhaps because of the uproar over wells being drilling so close to Red Hawk
Elementary, the state released final rules increasing the statewide well setback to a
uniform 500 feet in early 2013. It also required that wells be at least a thousand feet away
from large institutional buildings, including schools, unless the state issued a special
exception for a particular project. In a further twist on bottom-up federalism (Shipan and
Volden 2006), the 2013 legislative session in Colorado has seen the introduction of
dozens of bills related to oil and gas drilling, several of which relate to local authority over
the regulation and inspection of oil and gas operations (Proctor and Sealover 2013).
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Gruber thought that, in the wake of the MOU signing, "it just spread like wildfire from
what happened here, and the state realized it needed to start paying attention."
Lessons Learned: State Preemption, Problem Diffusion, and Local Government Capacity
By the middle of 2012, Erie had pursued a negotiated agreement, Dryden had passed a
drilling ban, and Washington County had crafted a land use ordinance that focused on
both where and how drilling could occur. As shown through these case studies, the towns'
different policies reflect legal and structural constraints from the state. In addition, the
three localities chose their distinct policies as a result of problem diffusion. Specific
problems about community character, air quality, and corporate responsibility diffused
over from neighboring towns, counties, and states-so the towns crafted different
regulations in response to these specific, different problems.
These localities then implemented their different policies in response to a number
of specific issues, including resident pressure and regional policy learning. And, most
interestingly, all three had the internal capacity to create complex statutes, doing extensive
online research and navigating within state rules.
Why the Different Policies: State Preemption and Problem Diffusion
Unsurprisingly, state preemption played a major role in Erie's, Washington
County's, and Dryden's policy-making processes. Erie chose its MOU strategy because the
courts had made it clear that they could not pursue their other regulatory ideas, and
Washington County quickly changed its ordinance once the state removed some of its
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regulatory authority. Dryden's drilling ban was passed in the absence of state political or
legal involvement, but the New York Supreme Court had to confirm that the state did not
preempt Dryden's regulatory authority in the matter. As legal scholars would predict
(Russel and Krummen 2012; Smith 2011; Goho 2012), state preemption was a major
reason why these three localities developed different policies.
But just as importantly, these towns developed different policies because they were
regulating different oil and gas problems, as a result of problem diffusion. Each town
chose a policy tool that confronted the major issues facing that town-water and
community character in Dryden, fiscal responsibility and water in Washington County,
and air pollution in Erie. This was no accident. All three localities looked to their nearby
neighbors, rather than across the country, to figure out what environmental and social
impacts from drilling mattered most to their residents. Dryden looked to Pennsylvanian
cities, Erie looked to the Front Range and Weld County, and Washington County looked
across the county line to Payette when choosing which problems to address. Rather than
developing policies in response to other cities' or counties' policies, they developed oil
and gas policy in response to other cities' and counties' problems.
This mechanism of policy-making and agenda-setting-regulating based on the
neighbor's problem-seems simple and intuitive, yet it adds to the existing, largely
quantitative literature on policy learning and diffusion. In fact, problem diffusion may not
just have implications for how cities and counties confront the rise of oil and gas drilling,
but also how local governments regulate and legislate in general. The occurrence of
problem diffusion at the local level suggests that the geography of policy problems
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matters-that nearby problems may hold more weight with local governments than those
reported from across the country.
Getting it Done: Resident Pressure, Regional Learning, and Local Competency
Of course, there were a variety of factors that then contributed to how these
individual localities got their chosen oil and gas policies passed. Erie and Dryden chose to
pursue oil and gas policies because of sustained resident pressure, though residents did
not have much say in promoting one policy over another once oil and gas was on the
agenda. In addition, regional learning and cooperation was important for Dryden. The
town's officials engaged in fact-finding with the other cities in its county, a process that
ultimately led all of the county's towns to ban all drilling activities and feel supported by
their neighbors in doing so. Similarly, Erie's neighboring town, Longmont, provided a
close-to-home lesson of what would happen if Erie overstepped its regulatory authority.
But most interestingly, all three towns were unconstrained by their ostensibly
meager technical skills. Erie did limit its policy options in fear of a costly lawsuit;
however, it instead opted for a time-consuming, technically sophisticated process of
negotiating agreements with oil and gas operators. Dryden pursued its policy tool of
choice with a full understanding that the issue would ultimately be settled in court,
confident that the town had the legal and technical skills to defend its ordinance. And
Washington County built off its conditional use framework to develop a comprehensive
set of operational requirements, based on a year of research and deliberation. The officials
of these small towns navigated around complex state statutes surprisingly effectively.
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The officials in these three small localities were also able to act in a technically
sophisticated manner because of the wealth of online information about oil and gas
drilling and local ordinances. This may reflect an important, broader trend in local
government capacity. Armed with a growing array of online resources, local governments
of small communities may now be able to deal with the complex regulatory problems that
had seemed out of their league in previous decades.
In sum, the stories of Washington County, Dryden, and Erie provide rich insight
into why localities across the United States are choosing different policy tools to confront
oil and gas drilling-and how they're passing and implementing those tools. The case
studies in this thesis suggest that state preemption and problem diffusion have played a
major role in how localities confront contentious issues like oil and gas drilling. Yet they
also suggest that local governments of small, rural communities do not have to be passive
recipients of state policy, or overseers of mundane maintenance issues; instead, local
officials can actively, competently navigate complex information and politics to confront
new policy problems.
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